Deterrence can help secure peace, Björn Bjarnason argues

Deterrence and a willingness to negotiate helped create the conditions for disarmament during the Cold War, Björn Bjarnason writes in a commentary published by mbl.is. The article looks back at the 1986 Reykjavík summit, whose 40th anniversary falls on Sunday, and argues that the same combination remains important today.

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio visited Höfði, the house where Ronald Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev held talks, earlier this week. At a later news conference, Rubio said deterrence was the best way to prevent violence and war. Cooperation between Iceland and its allies, Bjarnason writes, should help prevent conflict. Deterrence can create conditions for easing tensions, as it did in the past.

Forty years ago, the leaders of the superpowers combined resolve on defence with a willingness to negotiate. Today, Russia uses weapons, threats and provocations to impose its will, Bjarnason writes.

During the 1980s, Keflavík air base underwent its most extensive renewal since it was established. US government documents from 1987 described a billion-dollar programme that included reinforced aircraft hangars and new radar stations, intended to strengthen North Atlantic defences. Iceland was then, as it is now, an important link in the defence of routes between North America and Europe and in monitoring military activity in the region.

The United States also changed its naval strategy. Exercises demonstrated that it could take the initiative in the Norwegian Sea and, in the event of war, put pressure on the Soviet Northern Fleet closer to its home bases on the Kola Peninsula. Aircraft carriers, attack submarines and anti-submarine aircraft moved north. The Soviet Union had to account for the need to defend its own waters and key military bases, reducing its scope to threaten shipping routes across the Atlantic.

Protecting Soviet missile submarines was a central task for the Northern Fleet, and it remains important to Russia’s Northern Fleet. In 1989, Soviet navy chief Vladimir Chernavin said US naval policy posed a threat of nuclear attacks deep inside the Soviet Union and a blockade of its coast. His remarks reflected concern among Soviet naval leaders about the US forward-defence strategy and its effect on their position.

This military activity in the North Atlantic did not prevent Iceland from being chosen as the venue for the 1986 summit. Gorbachev travelled to a NATO country that hosted a US military base. After the talks at Höfði, Reagan addressed US military personnel at Keflavík, while Gorbachev held a news conference at Háskólabíó.

Iceland did not have to reject its defence cooperation to host the leaders. It stood with its allies while providing a setting for talks about the most far-reaching disarmament proposals of the Cold War.

Bjarnason says it is worth recalling this now because the view is often promoted in Iceland that strengthening defences increases tensions and makes negotiations harder. The Höfði summit also shows, he argues, that military pressure can contribute to peace and disarmament agreements. Deterrence can make negotiation more attractive than the use of force.

Nothing happens automatically, however. Military strength must be backed by political leaders who understand how to use it for that purpose. Reagan strengthened defences while also seeking talks. Gorbachev had the courage to take risks and pursue change at home and in relations with the West. The combination of strength and a willingness to negotiate created opportunities that politicians used.