Ceuta prompts Iceland to weigh EU membership framework

At the end of July, tens of thousands of people attempted to cross the border from Morocco into the Spanish city of Ceuta in North Africa, many in extremely dangerous conditions. In an opinion article published by mbl.is, Erna Bjarnadóttir writes that many people died in the desperate attempt to seek a better future.

The events also raised important questions about border controls, the Schengen cooperation and the responsibility of individual countries and the European Union when pressure is greatest. The answers are neither simple nor uniform.

Ceuta nevertheless provides an opportunity to consider a question that matters to Iceland as the country faces a decision on whether to resume membership negotiations with the European Union: what constitutional framework best serves a small state’s interests when it is put to the test?

Icelandic debate has long been shaped by the view that EU membership would give Iceland greater influence because it would have a seat at the decision making table. It is true that member states take part in decision making in a different way from EFTA states within the European Economic Area.

But having a seat at the table is not necessarily the same as being able to defend one’s own interests when they conflict with those of other countries. The European Union is a cooperation between sovereign states. The countries have many shared interests, but their national interests do not always coincide. When tested, the countries may reach different conclusions about what best serves their own national interests.

A seat at the table or protection for a small state’s interests

This is precisely the question raised by the events in Ceuta. The issue is not whether the European Union handled this particular case well or badly, but whether membership in itself changes how conflicts of interest between countries develop or are resolved.

The question also draws attention to Iceland’s position within the EEA. The agreement is sometimes presented as an interim stage on the way to full EU membership. That description is misleading. The EEA is not a waiting room for the European Union, but an independent form of European cooperation based on a different constitutional approach from full membership.

Iceland participates in Schengen cooperation but has no voting rights in the Council of the European Union when Schengen matters are discussed. This is often described as a significant flaw. Ceuta, however, provides grounds for examining the issue from several perspectives.

First, the events showed that a member state’s prime minister can make decisions with significant consequences for the European Union as a whole without first consulting the other member states. Second, they serve as a reminder that formal voting rights do not automatically ensure that a country can prevent developments or have decisive influence over them when pressure is greatest.

Spain has more than 100 times Iceland’s population and enjoys full rights within the European Union. Yet the events in Ceuta showed that this alone was not enough to secure the outcome the Spanish authorities would have preferred.

The EEA as an independent solution

The EEA agreement’s two pillar system was neither accidental nor a temporary solution. It was a deliberate constitutional design intended to ensure that the EFTA states had their own institutions, supervisory authority and court. The aim was to participate in the internal market without becoming part of the European Union’s institutional system.

When the Icesave dispute put the system under the greatest pressure, it became clear that this arrangement was not a formality. The case went before the EFTA Court rather than the Court of Justice of the European Union. For Iceland, that was of considerable importance.