Saying no keeps Iceland’s options open, columnist argues

In a submitted article published by mbl.is, Sveinn Óskar Sigurðsson argues that voting yes on 29 August would not simply keep Iceland’s options open, but would begin a process that could make leaving increasingly difficult.

The main argument for voting yes, he writes, is that Iceland would not be joining the European Union immediately. Instead, it would open the door, examine what was on offer and retain the option of saying no later if the agreement proved unfavourable.

But Iceland is currently outside the EU and therefore has both options available: joining or remaining outside. Neither door has been closed, Sigurðsson says, making the present position the most open one possible.

If an accession process begins, he argues, it will develop its own momentum. A negotiating mandate would be issued, the alignment of regulations would begin, costs would accumulate and institutional resistance to reversal would grow. The way back would not close overnight, but it would become more difficult and expensive the further the process progressed.

He points to the United Kingdom’s withdrawal as an example. Leaving was legally possible, he writes, but took years, cost a great deal and caused political upheaval. Having a formal right to leave, he says, is not the same as being able to use it without excessive cost.

Sigurðsson compares the situation to the ancient Greek myth of Theseus, who entered the Minotaur’s labyrinth to kill the monster. Theseus carried a sword, but what saved him was the thread given to him by the Cretan princess Ariadne. He followed the thread back out, unlike those who entered before him and never found their way out.

In the analogy, the option of leaving is Ariadne’s thread. As long as Iceland remains outside the EU, that thread remains intact. The further the country proceeds into the process, he argues, the longer and weaker the thread becomes, with a risk that it could eventually break.

He acknowledges the argument that a second vote should be held on the agreement itself and that the full terms cannot be known until negotiations take place. However, he says the process would carry costs, both financially and in terms of Iceland’s position.

He also argues that EU accession negotiations are not unrestricted bargaining between equal parties. They primarily concern how and when an applicant country adopts the EU’s common regulatory framework, with negotiations focused on timing and adjustment rather than the framework’s core principles. In areas of greatest importance to Iceland, including resources, he says there is little scope for permanent exemptions and no precedent for exemptions on the scale that would be required.

According to Sigurðsson, Iceland’s real negotiating strength lies not in what it can secure during the talks, but in its ability to remain outside. The option of leaving is itself the source of leverage, he argues, and starting the process would mean giving up the position that created that leverage in the first place.

He concludes that the more uncertain the future, the more valuable it is to retain an inexpensive and open route back.